I. Introduction
Americans produce about 375 million tons of municipal solid waste annually, or 1.3 tons per capita. Twenty-five to thirty percent of this material is recycled (Kaufman et al. 2004 ). These historically high recycling rates have often been attributed to growth in residential curbside access. Indeed, curbside programs have grown from 2,000 in 1990 to over 9,700 in 2000, and over 50 percent of the U.S. population now has curbside access.
Systematic empirical evidence on the impact of curbside programs, however, is rare. In this paper, we measure the extent to which curbside access affects recycled quantities. Importantly, we use novel data to distinguish between new material and material diverted from other recycling modes such as recycling centers. Failure to account for cannibalization from other modes may substantially over-estimate the benefits of curbside programs.
The impact of curbside recycling access on quantities recycled has important policy implications, as curbside programs are both costly and controversial. Curbside collection, transportation, sorting, and processing costs average approximately $2-$7 per household per month. Costs can be considerably higher in suburban and rural areas.
These costs have generated debate in many municipalities, and the best available evidence suggests the number of curbside programs fell by nearly nine percent between 2000 and 2002 (Kaufman et al. 2004) . We investigate the impact of curbside programs in the presence of alternative recycling modes using a panel of aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage container returns data from California's Department of Conservation. These data offer several advantages over the cross-sectional survey data found in most earlier studies. First, our data form the basis for payment disbursement to recyclers and are extremely reliable. Second, we use material specific quantity data. While many studies have examined indirect recycling measures such as the average stated propensity to recycle, our data directly measure the quantities of aluminum, glass and plastic recycled. Third, our data covers a wide geographic region over a relatively long time period. The resulting panel structure of the data provides a number of features desirable for econometric identification. For example, curbside programs were adopted locally and progressively introduced over time, so all areas were not affected equally. We are also able to control for unobservable heterogeneity while accounting for potential program endogeneity.
We measure the impact of marginal changes in the level of curbside on the quantity recycled using a fixed-effects panel data approach. For each material, we first examine the effect of curbside program expansion on the quantity of beverage containers returned at the curb. Next, we investigate the effects of curbside programs on the material-specific total amount of beverage containers recycled. After noting clear discrepancies between these first two effects, we consider the extent to which curbside expansion cannibalizes from recycling centers. Finally, we explore this diversion in more detail. In particular, we study the effect of structural and demographic characteristics on the diversion response.
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We find four main results. First, the impact of expanding curbside programs on total beverage containers recycled is small. Second, much of this result obtains because curbside programs significantly cannibalize returns from recycling centers. Third, the degree of cannibalization varies by material type. We find that diversion is strongest for heavier and bulkier materials like glass. Fourth, the degree of cannibalization is sensitive to structural and demographic characteristics. For example, we find that diversion of glass is particularly pronounced when income is high and unemployment is low.
Of the relatively small number of empirical papers that study recycling, our research is perhaps most closely related to Jenkins et al. (2003) 's important analysis.
Their paper used household survey data to demonstrate that the presence of a curbside program for a given material increased the probability that over 95 percent of an average household's material would be recycled by between 25 to 50 percent. Jenkins et al. (2003) further investigated the marginal effect of replacing a recycling center with a curbside program on households' propensity to recycle. Our paper differs in that it investigates the marginal effect of increasing curbside access on observed recycled quantities, controls for program endogeneity, and explores the effect of changes in curbside access on returns to existing recycling centers. This latter distinction is important since curbside programs typically supplement, rather than replace, recycling centers.
Our paper also shares features with Ashenmiller (2006) . Ashenmiller (2006) uses a unique individual level dataset from Santa Barbara, CA to assess the impacts of income and education on recycling behavior. The study finds that cash recycling is an important source of income for some poor households. Despite fundamentally different economic 5 questions, our paper and Ashenmiller (2006) both focus on recycling activities in the presence of a bottle bill. Additionally, both studies consider returns by material.
Our research also builds upon a broader empirical literature that examined the change in waste and recycling behavior as a function of policy variables and socioeconomic characteristics.
2 Using cross-sectional survey data, Hong et al. (1993) and Hong and Adams (1999) found that an increase in waste disposal fees increased curbside recycling participation and quantities recycled, but did not generate large reductions in trash. Rechovsky and Stone (1994) used similar data and found that curbside programs increased total recycling rates if implemented in conjuction with mandatory recycling and unit-based waste pricing. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) directly measured household waste generation, and their results suggested that garbage unit pricing increased curbside recycling, volumetric compacting, and illegal dumping significantly. Callan and Thomas (1997) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) used geographically diverse cross-sectional community level data and further examined the effects of unit pricing and recycling. An important contribution of Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) was illustrating the potential endogeneity of curbside program implementation. Finally, Ando and Gosselin (2005) made clear the importance of storage and distance to recycling facilities in a household's recycling decision.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the institutional context and describes our data from the California Department of Conservation. Section III presents our conceptual framework and our empirical methodology. Section IV presents our key results and their sensitivity. We first establish that incremental expansion of curbside 6 access has a very small effect on material-specific total beverage containers recycled.
Next, we demonstrate that this result largely obtains due to diversion from existing recycling streams. We then explore how various structural characteristics impact this diversion. Section V interprets our results for economics and policy. We conclude with simple cost effectiveness comparisons that incorporate the paper's empirical results.
Results suggest that saved household time costs would need to be large for incremental expansion of curbside access to be cost-effective.
II. Institutional Context & Data The Data Generating Process
The 
Our Sample
Our sample of California Department of Conservation recycling data consists of quarterly observations for the six year period 1995-2000. Time series variation in our data allows us to exploit panel techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity while accounting for potential program endogeneity. This particular period is promising for exploration because curbside programs were expanding, there were no major changes to the bottle bill or its associated redemption values, and data were readily available. For confidentiality purposes, all data is aggregated to the county level.
We exclude the 14 California counties with incomplete data or no curbside recycling during our sample period. The omitted counties are considerably more rural than included counties. As a consequence, the results of our analysis should be 9 extrapolated to predominantly rural areas with a degree of caution. 9 The resulting dataset consists of 1052 observations; we observe 44 counties over the 24 quarters between 1995(1) and 2000(4) with 4 missing data points. Observed variation in the materials collected by curbside programs is consistent with evidence for the United States as a whole (USEPA 1994). In particular, plastic recycling is rare relative to aluminum and glass, as plastic has a high volume-to-weight ratio (McCarthy 1993). In our sample, an average of 50.5 percent of the population of each county with access to curbside recycling was able to return aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers at the curb. 27.7 percent was able to curbside recycle only aluminum and glass, 18.6 percent was able to curbside recycle only aluminum, and 3.2 percent was able to curbside recycle only aluminum and plastic.
III. Analysis Conceptual framework
In this sub-section, we construct a conceptual framework for empirically analyzing disposal decisions in the presence of multiple recycling modes. The purpose of this simple framework is to motivate empirical specification and variable choice. The framework shares features of the models in Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) can be recycled at the curb (CS i ), recycled at drop-off recycling centers (RC i ), or not recycled (NR i ). The latter option incorporates trash, illegal dumping, etc. Preferences among disposal methods may depend upon household characteristics α. In this framework, subutility is maximized over disposal methods subject to a subgroup expenditure constraint and a quantity adding up constraint:
(1) max ( , , ; ) . .
Solving the representative consumer's choice problem (1) yields a system of estimable conditional demands for each material i:
A reduced-form version of the system of equations in (2) serves as the basis for our empirical estimation. Since we do not have data on non-recycled beverage containers, we follow Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and estimate each material-specific system as a series of demand equations. Since the independent variables in each equation are the same, there is no bias from estimating the system as separate equations.
As noted in Section II, our data are collected at the county-level. As with all economic analyses not performed at an individual level, aggregation consistent with economic theory implies strong restrictions on the structure of preferences. In particular, individual utility must follow the Gorman form and the marginal propensity to recycle must be independent of income within a given county.
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Variables
To examine the impact of curbside recycling on quantities returned at the curb, total recycling quantities, and recycling center quantities, we construct variables consistent with the conceptual framework developed above. Our key dependent variables are material-specific per capita recycled quantities of beverage containers. For example, we consider per capita pounds of aluminum beverage containers recycled at the curb, recycled in total, and recycled at drop-off recycling centers.
Important explanatory variables include those that represent the time and money prices of recycling modes in (2). In this vein, the key explanatory variable is the percent of a county's population served by curbside programs. This serves as a proxy for the price of curbside recycling. We also include recycling centers per square mile and two measures of recycling center hours open as proxies for the price of drop-off recycling 11 When income enters the econometrics that follow, it enters linearly. This is consistent with a constant marginal propensity to recycle. Here, aggregation also requires linearity in price.
14 centers. The California Redemption Value (CRV) refund, while naturally a large part of drop-off recycling center price, remains constant across space and time is therefore relegated to the regression constant.
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Other independent variables include total quarterly per capita consumption of each material at the state-level, since our conceptual framework indicates that quantities recycled are a function of total beverages consumed. County-level data is not available, so we augment statewide beverage sales with county-specific average temperature (a well known predictor of packaged beverage consumption). 13 We also include quarterly dummies and year dummies to account for seasonality and broad trends in the real price of beverages, beverage consumption, and the propensity to recycle.
Finally, we exploit the panel structure of the data by including fixed effects. This captures systematic differences across counties and serves as a proxy for α in our conceptual framework. Fixed-effects may represent county-specific factors such as size, location, density, and demographic characteristics like education and income.
Regression Model
We ask three questions. First, to what extent does increasing the share of the population with access to curbside recycling increase the quantity of beverage containers recycled at the curb? Second, to what extent does increasing the share of the population served by curbside programs increase the total quantity of beverage containers recycled?
Third, to what extent does increasing the share of the population served by curbside programs cannibalize beverage container returns from other recycling modes?
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Operationally, we regress material-specific beverage container returns on the share of the population served by curbside programs. A natural concern is that our policy variables may be statistically endogenous. For example, counties with curbside recycling programs that on average succeed in bringing back large quantities of material may seek to expand their use. Alternatively, perhaps counties with low total recycling on average may be particularly motivated to expand curbside access. However, the included countylevel fixed effects prevent bias from this type of statistical endogeneity. 14 An important implication is that identification comes from within-county time variation rather than variation between counties.
In short, the basic regression model for each material can be written y it = X it β + α i + ε it , where i indexes the unit of observation (county) and t indexes time (quarters). α i captures time invariant county-level fixed effects and ε it represents the usual idiosyncratic error term. The columns of the matrix X include all of the preceding subsection's explanatory variables. As previously noted, the most important of these is the share of a county's population served by curbside in that period.
The regression model has three noteworthy features. First, the dependent variables are material-specific. This is important because materials vary considerably by weight and bulk, which affect the ease of recycling. Further, policy decisions are frequently material-specific, as many curbside programs are limited to a subset of container types.
Second, the dependent variables measure beverage container recycling quantities. The advantage of quantity data is that they match conceptual conditional demand models more directly than often-cited measures such as propensity to recycle. Third, the 14 It is also possible that there is statistical endogeneity in a time variant fashion. However, this seems less plausible since it is unlikely that counties observe returns and very rapidly adjust curbside access.
16 endogeneity controls afforded by the fixed effects α i are novel relative to the previously cited literature.
IV. Empirical Results What is the Effect of Curbside Access on Curbside Returns?
We begin by considering the most immediate impact of curbside access: to what extent does increasing curbside coverage increase the quantity of material recycled at the curb? While the related theoretical results are unambiguous, the empirical evidence on this question remains surprisingly equivocal. For example, Reschovsky and Stone (1994) fail to reject the hypothesis that curbside recycling programs alone do not yield an increase in the propensity to recycle.
Results from fixed-effects linear regressions of curbside beverage container return quantities on the percent of the population served by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table 2 . Computed standard errors are heteroskedasticconsistent. T-statistics appear in parentheses. Results in Table 2 
What is the Effect of Curbside Access on Total Recycling Returns?
We now consider the impact of curbside access on total recycling returns. Results of the preceding sub-section indicated that, on the margin, increased curbside access is associated with increased beverage container returns at the curb. However, for policymakers a more relevant question is whether curbside programs increase total beverage container recycling.
Results from fixed-effects linear regressions of total beverage container return quantities on the percent of the population served by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table 3 . Again, computed standard errors are heteroskedasticconsistent and t-statistics appear in parentheses. Results in Table 3 indicate that the estimated impact of increasing curbside access on total beverage container returns is positive, but small. In fact, for aluminum and glass beverage containers, we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no relationship between increased curbside access and total returns. For plastic, the coefficient translates into 0.48 20 percent of mean total quantity. In other words, a one percent increase in the percent of the population served by plastic curbside programs translates roughly into a 0.48 percent increase in total returns of plastic beverage containers. While the aluminum and glass coefficients are not statistically different from zero, we note that the coefficients translate into 0.07 and 0.08 percent increases in total returns, respectively.
In contrast to the results for a marginal expansion of curbside, Table 3 indicates that the effects of recycling center characteristics on total recycling are substantial. For example, recycled quantities increase significantly with the average number of open hours for both glass and plastic beverage containers. Further, increasing the density of recycling centers has a large and significant impact on aluminum and glass returns.
What is the Effect of Curbside Access on Recycling Center Returns?
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are initially puzzling. Table 2 indicates that increases in curbside availability are associated with increases in quantities recycled at the curb. However, Table 3 indicates that increases in curbside availability are not associated with increases in total recycling for aluminum and glass.
Further, marginal increases in total recycling for plastic are modest relative to the marginal increases in curbside returns. If greater curbside access increases returns at the curb, but not in total, perhaps curbside programs are diverting recycling from other alternatives on the margin.
Results from fixed-effect linear regressions of recycling center beverage container return quantities on the percent of the population served by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table 4 . Computed standard errors are heteroskedasticconsistent and t-statistics appear in parentheses. Results in Table 4 indicate that the estimated impact of expanding curbside access on drop-off recycling center returns is negative for glass and plastic beverage containers.
Results are economically and statistically significant for glass, and perhaps economically significant for plastic. 
Sensitivity Analysis
The preceding section established that increasing curbside recycling programs has a positive effect on the quantity of containers collected at the curb, but a small effect on total recycled containers. For bulkier and heavier materials like glass and plastic, these small incremental changes in total returns are at least partially attributable to significant cannibalization from existing recycling streams. Below, we provide evidence that these results are robust to the choice of variable definition and model specification. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to other program variables.
For example, the larger literature on municipal solid waste has often emphasized the effects of garbage unit pricing ("pay-as-you-throw" programs) on household refuse and recycling choices. See, for example, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) and Callan and Thomas (1997) . In our conceptual framework, the presence of unit pricing programs may well proxy for the price of non-recycling. In our analysis, the fixed effects likely pick up most pay-as-you-throw impacts, since there was little variation in such programs at the county-level for our sample period. However, as a sensitivity experiment, we included a Tables 2-4 .
Finally, we consider the possibility that recycling of one type of material may depend on the availability of curbside recycling for other materials. We therefore regress beverage container recycling quantities on the percent of the population served by commonly observed curbside collection programs. 15 Results from the augmented regressions are similar to those presented in Tables 2-4 . Increasing curbside access generally increases beverage containers recycled at the curb. Diversion is strongly present for glass, not present for aluminum, and may be economically (but not statistically) significant for plastic. Interestingly, we also find some evidence in support of the 15 In our sample, we never observe glass and/or plastic collection without aluminum collection. 44 percent of program expansions or introductions simultaneously collected aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers. 41 percent of program expansions or introductions collected only aluminum beverage containers. 12 percent of program expansions or introductions collected only aluminum and glass. Aluminum and plastic expansions or introductions were rare. Therefore, specific variables include the percent of population served by aluminum only curbside programs, aluminum and glass only curbside programs, aluminum and plastic curbside only programs, and aluminum, glass, and plastic curbside programs.
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hypothesis that the impact of curbside expansion may be stronger when all materials are collected versus when only a subset is collected.
Further Exploration
The analyses of the preceding sub-sections presented evidence that cannibalization between recycling modes is occurring, with economically significant effects for glass and plastic. Here, we extend our analysis to study the impact of structural and demographic characteristics on the diversion response. This extension links to a previous literature that explored the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and the general propensity to recycle. See, for example, Hong, Adams, and Love (1993) and Hong and Adams (1999) .
To this end, we augment the diversion regressions (summarized in Table 4 ) with time variant county-level socioeconomic variables, such as the median family income, unemployment, and population density in a given county. For each material, we include these regressors directly and interacted with our curbside access variables. Results from fixed-effects linear regressions of recycling center beverage container return quantities on the percent of the population served by curbside programs, socioeconomic interactions, and other covariates are presented in Table 5 . Note that identification still comes from county-specific variation over time, since we retain fixed-effects. Computed standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent and t-statistics appear in parentheses. We begin our interpretation of the results in Table 5 by considering the coefficients on the uninteracted curbside access variables. Holding median family income, unemployment, and population at zero, the marginal effect of an increase in the percent of the population served by curbside on drop-off recycling center beverage container returns is negative for every material. The results are statistically significant for 27 aluminum and plastic and similar in magnitude to the significant results in Table 4 for glass. While too much emphasis should not be placed on interpreting outcomes conditioned on zeroed socioeconomic variables, results are at least suggestive that economically significant cannibalization between recycling streams is robust across specifications.
Results in Table 5 also show that the interaction between population density and curbside access is significant for plastic. An intuitive interpretation of the positive coefficient is that the diversionary response becomes stronger (more negative) as density decreases. In other words, consumers are more likely to forego redemption payments in exchange for convenience, particularly for bulky items like plastic containers, when population density decreases. The results in Table 5 on the interaction between median family income and curbside access are mixed. For glass, an intuitive interpretation of the significant negative coefficient is that the diversionary response becomes stronger (more negative) as median family income increases. In other words, consumers are more likely to forego redemption payments in exchange for convenience when income increases. For aluminum, however, the interaction coefficient is significant and positive. While this result is perhaps initially puzzling, there are at least two plausible explanations. First, when income is relatively high, there may be spillover effects from increased awareness of recycling options. Thus, as curbside programs become more prominent, returns to all recycling streams increase.
Second, when median family income is particularly high, increases in curbside access may lead to disproportionately higher levels of scavenging. In this context, scavenging refers a situation in which materials originally left at the curb are removed by third parties and returned to recycling centers for their cash redemption value. Since scavenging is most likely to occur for light, compactable materials such as aluminum, this explanation seems plausible. For a complete analysis of this phenomenon, see Ashenmiller (2006) .
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V. Interpretation and Policy Discussion
This paper uses a novel dataset to investigate the extent to which curbside access affects recycled quantities. Results suggest marginal increases in curbside availability increase returns at the curb, but have very small impacts on total recycled quantities of beverage containers. Specifically, a one percent increase in the percent of a county's population served by curbside programs increases total beverage container recycling returns by only 0.48 percent for plastic, 0.08 percent for glass, and 0.07 percent for aluminum. Impacts for glass and aluminum are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
A large reason for the small net gains from incrementally expanding curbside programs is cannibalization from existing recycling streams, particularly for heavier and bulkier materials. We detect no diversion for aluminum, but nearly 21 percent of incremental plastic curbside quantities are diverted from existing recycling center returns.
16 Note that scavenging does not impact the important total recycled beverage container results in Table 3 and can only lead to a conservative understatement of the key cannibalization results in 
Quantity Comparisons
To further put our results in perspective, we conduct some simple quantity comparisons that incorporate our empirical results. We first consider the efficacy of expanding curbside access relative to expanding recycling center hours of operation. For glass, a one percent increase in the percent of the population served by curbside generates 12 times less total recycled quantity than expanding recycling center hours by one hour per week. In other words, the same increase in total glass beverage recycling is obtained We next compare the efficacy of expanding curbside access relative to expanding the number of recycling centers. For glass, a one percent increase in curbside access generates 6 times less total recycled quantity than adding one recycling center per county.
In other words, the same increase in total glass is obtained by expanding the number of recycling centers per county by one or by increasing the percent of the population with access to curbside by 6 percent. For aluminum, a one percent increase in the percent of the population served by curbside generates 2.2 times less total recycled quantity than expanding the number of recycling centers by one per county. For plastic, point estimates suggest a one percent increase in the percent of the population served by curbside generates 7.3 times more total recycled quantity than an additional center per county.
Cost Effectiveness Comparisons
To further put our results in perspective, we also conduct some simple cost effectiveness comparisons that incorporate our empirical results and the quantity comparisons above. These exercises take as given a policy objective of returning a fixed number of beverage containers of a given material type. 18 To conduct the comparisons, we first discuss the costs associated with incremental curbside expansion and incremental recycling center expansion.
Our average sample county contains 740,000 people, so a one percent increase in the population served by curbside supplies approximately 7,400 people. We divide by Our average sample county contains 44 recycling centers. Increasing center hours by one hour per week then generates an additional 176 hours per county per month on average. We are unable to obtain precise numerical estimates for recycling center operating costs, but expenses typically include low-skilled labor costs, transportation costs to the sorting facility, modest administration and overhead expenses, taxes, and capital costs (USEPA (1994)). In general, these costs are quite low, since convenience zone and other recycling centers often simply consist of several material-specific bins, an operator, some scales, and record-keeping materials.
Ideally, comparisons would identify all costs of a complete analysis. For example, a complete assessment would account for the relative differences in time costs between expanded curbside programs and drop-off recycling center expansion. Jakus et al. (1996) , Jakus et al. (1997) , and Ando and Gosselin (2005) find that factors that decrease time cost importantly impact households' propensity to recycle. Consequently, given available data, our cost-effectiveness analysis can be interpreted as providing a sense of how large the non-measured costs of center expansion would have to be to make incremental curbside cost-effective relative to incremental recycling centers. Table 6 presents our simplified cost effectiveness comparisons. Recall that calculations assume a fixed policy objective of recycling a fixed number of beverage containers. We first summarize the quantity comparisons from the preceding discussion.
From these figures and the observed costs discussed above, we then calculate break-even points for recycling center operating costs. For example, consider the third column of row 1 in Table 6 . First, we divide the $6912 incremental increase per county per month in curbside expenditures by 176 hours per county per month to obtain the hourly break-even center operating expenses if the curbside increase and the recycling center increase generated the same change in total incremental beverage containers recycled. We then multiply this amount by the differential returns between the programs (12) to obtain the final break-even operating expenses per recycling center hour. a All calculations based upon total recycled quantity results in Table 3 . Superscript * indicates a calculation derived from a statistically significant coefficient.
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All calculations in Table 6 based upon statistically significant coefficients yield results with high break-even expenses. Abstracting from unobserved costs, the breakeven points can be interpreted as follows. For glass, the annual operating expenses of a single recycling center would have to exceed approximately $497,000 for a one percent increase in the percent of population served by curbside to be more cost effective than an additional recycling center per county. For aluminum, the annual operating costs of a recycling center would have to exceed roughly $182,000 for a one percent increase in the percent of population served by curbside to be cost-effective relative to an additional recycling center per county. Similarly, glass and plastic recycling center hourly operating expenses would have to surpass $471 and $90 for incremental curbside expansion to be more cost effective than an additional working hour per center.
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Of course, these comparisons do not identify all subtleties of a complete analysis.
For example, both recycling centers and curbside programs can simultaneously accept multiple materials. In other words, the material-specific cost effectiveness comparisons 20 During our sample period, the state paid per container "handling fees" to recycling centers in convenience zones. For example, in 1999 the state paid fees of 1.7 cents per eligible container over the CRV. However, if a recycling center redeemed more than 500,000 containers in a given month, they were no longer eligible to receive the handling fee. At the margin, this creates a clear disincentive for some recycling centers to expand their accessibility. Our results suggest that eliminating this disincentive may also be a cost effective means of increasing total recycled quantities.
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may not be independent of one another. Further, these calculations take a policy objective as given that may not be socially optimal. For example, a full benefit-cost analysis may find that curbside programs have sufficient spillover effects to other materials (e.g. paper,
etc.) to offset their costs. This represents a promising area of future research.
Conclusion
Curbside recycling rarely exists in isolation. This paper uses novel and reliable data to analyze the impact of curbside recycling when other recycling modes are present.
We consider the impact of access to curbside recycling on quantities returned to the curb, total quantities returned, and quantities returned to drop-off recycling centers.
We find that the impact of incrementally expanding curbside programs on total quantities of beverage containers recycled is small. Much of this result obtains because curbside programs significantly cannibalize returns from recycling centers. Since we focus on beverage containers, we observe diversion even when the recycler must forgo a cash payment in order to return materials to the curb. It seems plausible that our direct diversion results for beverage containers understate the direct diversion incentives for materials outside of our sample. In other words, if we had data on paper and other materials, we would expect our key results to be stronger.
Finally, our calculations indicate incremental curbside access expansion may not be the least cost option for increasing beverage container recycling returns. Recall that these are marginal results, and curbside programs are already prominent in many areas.
Specifically, our results indicate that household time cost differences would need to be large for the marginal costs of recycling center availability to outweigh the marginal costs of curbside expansion.
